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The English School meets the Chicago School: The Case for a 
Grounded Theory of International Institutions1 
(Final pre-publication draft 03/08/12) 
Peter Wilson, London School of Economics and Political Science 
 
Abstract 
 
The concept of primary international institutions is a core idea of the English 
School and central to those scholars from Bull to Buzan who have sought to 
take it in a more sociological direction. Yet the English School has traditionally 
found it difficult to define and identify with consistency the institutions of 
international society. A group of scholars, here called the ‘new 
institutionalists’, have recently sought to address this problem by devising 
tighter definitions and applying them more rigorously. But different 
understandings and lists of institutions continue to proliferate. The source of 
the problem is the reliance on ‘stipulative’ definitions, drawn from an 
increasingly abstract theoretical literature. The problem is compounded by the 
new institutionalists’ employment of social structural and other ‘outsider’ 
methods of social research. This article argues that it is only possible to 
empirically ground institutions, a task on which all agree, by returning to the 
interpretive ‘insider’ approach traditionally associated with the school—but 
employing it in a much more rigorous way. To this end it makes the case for a 
‘grounded theory’ of international institutions inspired by Chicago School 
sociology. 
 
The English School (ES) concept of primary international institutions, having 
lain dormant for several decades, has recently been picked up by a number of 
theorists (e.g. Buzan, 2004; Holsti, 2004; Navari, 2011; Schouenborg, 2011; 
Clark, 2011) and deemed a highly promising tool for empirical analysis and 
theoretical development in International Relations (IR). Primary institutions, to 
provide a preliminary definition, are not formal organizations such as the EU, 
NATO or the UN, but ‘set[s] of habits and practices shaped towards the 
realization of common goals’ (Bull, 1977: 74). They are more diffuse and 
fundamental than international institutions in the ‘organizations’, and in ES 
parlance, ‘secondary’ sense. When it is claimed (e.g. Suganami, 1983; 
Suganami, 2003: 253-4; Buzan, 2004: 161, 166; Dunne, 2001a: 69-80) that 
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concern for the institutional structure of inter-state relations is a defining 
feature of the ES, or that ‘Bull … worked in conjunction with a group of 
theorists and practitioners, now identified as the founding fathers of the 
English school of international relations, who stressed the importance of the 
institutional foundations of state behaviour’ (Little and Williams, 2006: 1), it is 
institutions in the primary sense to which reference is being made.  According 
to Buzan (2005b: 190) the concept of primary institutions is the ‘core idea’ of 
the ES. In Clark’s view (2011: 46) it is its ‘central insight’.  According to 
Schouenborg (2011: 27) it is its ‘central concept’. 
 
 Given this it is perhaps surprising that there is little agreement within 
the ES about the number and identity of international society’s primary 
institutions. Various lists have been drawn up with some containing as few as 
three institutions and one containing as many as 26. Initially the problem was 
considered to be definitional. Pioneers of the concept such as Hedley Bull put 
forward definitions that were vague and/or had a tendency to shift and/or were 
not applied with sufficient rigour. If a tighter definition could be devised, it was 
believed, and applied more consistently, agreement would soon ensue. On 
this definitional front some progress has been made. But a more fundamental 
problem remains. While definitions of institutions in ES writing have got tighter 
they remain ‘stipulative’, i.e. they are conjured up by the researcher with no 
reference to the language and understandings of the practitioner (more on this 
below).  No end of work on the definitional problem will lead to a more 
satisfactory and objective list of institutions as long as definitions remain 
stipulative. In this article I argue, firstly, that the fundamental problem is the 
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failure to ground institutions empirically, and by ‘grounding institutions 
empirically’ I mean empirically determine not only their identity but how we 
should conceive them. Secondly, I argue that the only way this problem can 
be effectively combated is by constructing a grounded theory (GT) of 
international institutions inspired by Chicago School sociology. No amount of 
social structural or other ‘outsider’ theorising (e.g. Buzan and Albert, 2010) 
can provide the material needed to properly ground primary institutions (and, 
as we shall see, related concepts such as ‘practices’). The ‘insider’ approach 
of GT provides our best, perhaps our only, hope. 
 
The Classic English School 
Agreement among members of what has been termed the ‘classic’ English 
school (Navari, 2009b: 1; Wilson, 2009: 167) on the institutions of 
international society was not great despite the considerable mutual influence 
among them. In one place (see Table 1), Wight lists the institutions of 
international society as diplomacy, alliances, guarantees, war and neutrality 
(Wight, 1978: 111). In another place they are messengers, conferences and 
international institutions (meaning organizations), a diplomatic language, and 
trade (Wight, 1977: 29-33). In a celebrated introduction to Wight’s thought, 
Bull lists Wight’s institutions as alliances, diplomacy and war (Bull in Wight, 
1977: 6; see Table 2). Yet some pages later he offers a different list: 
international law, resident embassies, great powers, and the balance of power 
(Bull in Wight, 1977, 17; see also Wight, 1978: 12; Hall, 2006: 123-6). In 
Wight’s celebrated lectures on International Theory they are listed as 
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diplomacy, alliances, the balance of power, guarantees, arbitration and war 
(Wight, 1991: 141). 
 
Table 1: Institutions of International Society: Wight (see end of document) 
 
 
Table 2: Institutions of International Society: Wight according to Bull (see end 
of document) 
 
 
Wight was first and foremost a historian, not a theorist. He put thinking 
about the institutional structure of the society of states (and historical societies 
of states) on the map, but conceptual analysis was not his forte. It might be 
said, therefore, that it is to the more sociologically orientated Bull that we 
should turn for a definition and more rigorously determined list. Indeed, it is 
Bull to whom IR theorists sympathetic to the ES project almost invariably turn 
when thinking about the institutions of international society. In The Anarchical 
Society he established the benchmark institutional list—the P5, we might say, 
of international theory: the balance of power, international law, diplomacy, 
war, and the concert of Great Powers (Bull, 1977: Part II; see Table 3). In one 
place, however, he suggests that ‘states themselves…are the principal 
institutions of the society of states’ (Bull, 1977: 71; see also Bull, 1972: 34); 
and in one of his last works Bull unaccountably abandons war as one of his 
institutions, putting in its place international organizations (Bull, 1990: 90; see 
also Bull and Watson, 1984: 118).  
 5 
 
 
Table 3: Institutions of International Society: Bull (see end of document) 
 
The difficulties of including war as an institution of international society have 
been much commented upon (see e.g. Suganami, 1983: 2379; Jones, 2006: 
162; Holsti, 2004: 275-99) and there is no need to discuss them here. Suffice 
it to say there are far-reaching ethical, legal and theoretical problems with an 
undifferentiated concept of war that no doubt prompted Bull to think again 
about his elevation of it to institutional status. Yet the lack of an explanation 
for his change of mind is not the main problem. The main problem is the lack 
of a precise and stable definition. To his initial definition, cited above, of 
institutions as ‘set[s] of habits and practices’, Bull adds for example ‘a 
common diplomatic language’ and ‘shared beliefs’ (see Little, 2006: 107). In 
one place he talks not of ‘habits and practices shaped towards the realization 
of common goals’ but, even more generally, of ‘a settled pattern of behaviour’ 
(Bull, 1977: 184). In a major work in which the notion of institutions in the 
primary sense receives wide iteration there is no attempt to define it at all (Bull 
and Watson, 1984).  In fact Wight does rather better than Bull on the 
definitional front. He says that by ‘institutions’ he does not mean ‘determinate 
organizations housed in determinate buildings such as the League of Nations 
in the Palais des Nations or the United Nations in the East River building’, but 
‘recognised and established usages governing the relations between 
individuals or groups’ such as marriage or property; or, alternatively, 
‘enduring, complex, integrated, organized behaviour pattern[s] through which 
social control is exerted and by means of which the fundamental social 
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desires or needs are met’ (Wight, 1991: 140-1, quoting sociologist Morris 
Ginsberg). However, while this attempt to root his understanding in the 
sociological literature is to be welcomed there is little evidence that Wight 
applied it at all rigorously. We have the definitions and we have the lists but 
nowhere is there an attempt to systematically link the two. 
 
The variation and uncertainty about which ‘sets of habits and 
practices’, ‘recognised and established usages’, or ‘organized behaviour 
patterns’ that are to count as international institutions has persisted among 
those directly influenced by Wight and Bull. In an admirable assessment of 
the prospects for international progress at the millennium, James Mayall 
declares that ‘the framework that I have adopted describes the context of 
international relations in terms of a set of institutions—law, diplomacy, the 
balance of power etc.—and principles’ (Mayall, 2000: 149-50). In the latter 
category (‘principles’) he includes sovereignty, territorial integrity, non-
intervention, self-determination, non-discrimination, and respect for human 
rights (see Table 4). Earlier in the book, however, he implies that sovereignty 
is an institution, along with diplomacy and international law, with the balance 
of power, the special role of the Great Powers, and war occupying an 
ambiguous position as quasi- or contested institutions (Mayall, 2000:11-12; 
see also 41-2, 83, 132). Yet he also refers to the balance of power as a 
principle, and moreover one of ‘such convenient plasticity that it could be 
advanced in defence of almost any conceivable policy’ (Mayall, 2000: 12)—an 
assertion that somewhat undercuts the idea that it is one of international 
society’s institutions.  
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Table 4: Institutions and Principles of International Society: Mayall (see end of 
document) 
 
As with Wight (though less so Bull) there is, therefore, a good deal of 
ambivalence in Mayall on the nature and identity of international society’s 
primary institutions. The same could be said of other notable members of the 
school (cf. Bull and Watson 1984: 24-5; Watson 1992: 202-13). Taken as a 
whole it is evident that the only institution on which classic ES thinkers agree 
is diplomacy. Yet even here there are complexities. For Wight diplomacy was 
the ‘master institution’ of international society (1978: 113). For Bull, however, 
the most fundamental institution was the balance of power (Bull, 1977: 106-7; 
Alderson and Hurrell, 2000: 5; Little, 2007: 128-9). Interestingly those 
successors of Bull and Wight who have given most attention to the role of 
diplomacy in international society have not made much of its institutional 
character. For James (1993a: 94-6, 100) diplomacy is fundamental to the 
existence of international society, but he has reservations about the virtue of 
designating it as an institution. Watson (1983) accepts the designation but 
does little with it, not delving into its theoretical implications. In the most 
detailed recent exploration of diplomacy from an ES perspective, Paul Sharp 
accepts Wight’s view of its master institutional status but also suggests 
(echoing James) that in a very specific sense it is pre-social; not an institution 
of international society but a precondition of its existence. According to Sharp 
(2009: 11) it is ‘diplomacy which constitutes, and diplomats (in the sense of 
those who act diplomatically) who produce, the international societies which 
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put relations between separate groups on a more stable and peaceful footing 
than they otherwise would be’. It is diplomacy that enables international 
society to emerge from a mere system.2 
 
The New Institutionalists 
Noting some of these difficulties, in particular the failure of Bull et al to define 
in sharper detail what they understand by ‘the institutions of international 
society’, several scholars have recently sought to pin down the concept and/or 
put ES use of it on firmer methodological ground. In this section I focus on the 
efforts of, respectively, Buzan, Holsti, and Schouenborg, who together might 
be regarded as the avant garde of what the latter author has termed a ‘new 
institutionalism’.  
Buzan begins by relating ES uses of ‘institutions’ to those of other 
schools, notably neo-liberalism and regime theory. As well as an attempt to 
find common ground and build a transatlantic bridge between these prominent 
bodies of theory3, Buzan uses comparative analysis to tease out their relative 
strengths and weaknesses. The aim is to forge a much more robust, 
theoretically self-conscious, and analytically inclusive concept. Building on the 
work of Keohane, Searle, Mayall, Wight, Bull, and Holsti among others, he 
arrives at a much expanded list of institutions which he subdivides into 
primary and secondary institutions, with primary institutions also subdivided 
between master and derivative. Derivative institutions are subordinate to and 
generated by master institutions (Buzan, 2004: 161-204; see Table 5).  
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Table 5: Primary Institutions of International Society: Buzan 4 (see end of 
document) 
 
 Buzan (2004: 165, 169) contends that the ES has been far more 
interested in primary than secondary institutions. Secondary institutions are 
conceived as formal bodies and organisations founded for a specific purpose, 
with the capacity for purposive action. Yet they can also consist of ‘related 
complexes of rules and norms, identifiable in time and place’ (Keohane 
quoted in Buzan, 2004: 164-5), or ‘relatively stable collection[s] of practices 
and rules defining appropriate behaviour for specific groups of actors in 
specific situations’ (March and Olson quoted in Buzan, 2004: 165)—
definitions akin to conventional understandings of ‘regimes’. Primary 
institutions, on the other hand, are ‘more fundamental practices’ (Keohane 
quoted in Buzan, 2004: 165), rules, and constraints which may be ‘embedded 
in structures of meaning and schemes of interpretation that explain and 
legitimise particular identities and the practices and rules associated with 
them’ (Meyer, Boli and Thomas quoted in Buzan, 2004: 165). Such practices 
and rules are evolved more than designed, and they are ‘constitutive of actors 
and their patterns of legitimate activity in relation to each other’ (Buzan, 2004: 
167). In contrast to secondary institutions (the focus of regime theorists) which 
are ‘for the most part consciously designed by states’, primary institutions (the 
focus of the ES) are ‘constitutive of both states and international society in 
that they define the basic character and purpose of any such society’ (Buzan, 
2004: 166). They are ‘durable and recognised patterns of shared practices 
rooted in values held commonly by the members of interstate societies, and 
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embodying a mix of norms, rules and principles’ (Buzan, 2004: 181). In a later 
article, Buzan helpfully simplifies this attempt to distil from several quite 
diverse bodies of literature a definition of both primary and secondary 
institutions. He defines secondary institutions as ‘designed, instrumental 
arrangements and organizations’, and primary institutions as ‘deeper, more 
organic, evolved social practices that constitute both the actors and the 
“game” of international society’ (Buzan, 2006: 366). With regard to their 
relationship, primary institutions are the ‘enduring fundamental practices 
which shape and constrain the formation, evolution, and demise of secondary 
institutions’ (Buzan 2005a: 120).   
 
At the same time that Buzan was seeking to strengthen the foundations 
of the ES’s approach to international institutions another book appeared 
(Holsti: 2004) which had the notion of primary institutions at its core. While its 
principal object was not to identify these institutions and further the theoretical 
debate about them, it is arguably the most systematic study to date of the 
nature and role of institutions in international society. Moreover it is one that 
uses Bull’s work as a staring point and draws on Bull’s insights at many points 
in the argument. It might be considered a work of the ES in all but name.5  
 
For Holsti, institutions are the ‘context within which the games of 
international politics are played. They represent patterned (typical) actions 
and interactions of states, the norms, rules, and principles which guide (or fail 
to guide) them, and the major ideas and beliefs of a historical era’ (Holsti, 
2004: 18). In adopting this broad approach Holsti explicitly follows Bull. He 
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acknowledges that there is no consensus on the meaning of institutions in the 
IR literature, and declares that his preference for Bull’s understanding is 
based on its reference to ideas, practices, and beliefs of state-actors as well 
as the rules and standards which comprise, for example, Keohane’s 
understanding (Holsti, 2004: 21, fn. 5). He also subscribes to the 
understanding of Wendt and Duval (1989) who assert that the ES’s notion of 
institutions (meaning, it should be noted, Hedley Bull’s understanding) is 
similar to the notion of gemeinschaft. It entails shared intersubjective 
understandings and practices which constitute and are constituted by state 
interaction (Holsti, 2004: 21, fn. 5). 
 
So how do we know what institutions exist internationally? Holsti posits 
three criteria. International institutions consist of: (i) patterned practices; (ii) 
‘coherent sets of ideas and/or beliefs that describe the needs for the common 
practices and point out how certain goals can be achieved through them’ 
(Holsti, 2004: 21); and (iii) rules and etiquette which prescribe and proscribe 
certain kinds of behaviour. These rules and this etiquette reflect norms which 
are ‘shared expectations about appropriate behaviour’ (Finnemore, quoted in 
Holsti, 2004: 22). Alternatively they are stipulations of the ‘parameters of 
acceptable collective behaviour’ (Jean-Louis Durand, quoted in Holsti, 2004: 
22). The three major components of international institutions are thus: (i) 
patterned practices; (ii) ideas and beliefs; (iii) rules and norms. Holsti then 
distinguishes between two types of institutions. Foundational institutions, on 
the one hand, define and give privileged status to certain actors. They 
stipulate the fundamental principles, norms, and rules upon which their mutual 
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relations are based. The foundational institutions of international society, for 
example, distinguish the states-system/international society (Holsti uses these 
terms by and large interchangeably) from other modes of world political 
organisation. The foundational institutions of the Westphalian international 
system ‘include sovereignty, territoriality, and the fundamental rules of 
international law’ (Holsti, 2004: 25). Procedural institutions, on the other hand, 
comprise ‘repetitive practices, ideas and norms that underlie and regulate 
interactions and transactions between the separate actors’ (Holsti, 2004: 25). 
They are principally concerned with setting the boundaries of legitimate 
conduct. The procedural institutions of the Westphalian syste ‘include 
diplomacy, trade, colonialism, and war’ (Holsti, 2004: 27; see Table 6). 
 
Table 6: Institutions of International Society: Holsti (see end of document) 
 
Armed with these conceptual tools Holsti sets about identifying logically 
and transparently the institutions of international society—something that Bull, 
as he rightly says, failed to do. Holsti rejects two of Bull’s institutions: great 
power concert, and the balance of power. The activities of the great powers, 
he argues, do not meet the criterion of patterned practices, except perhaps for 
the period of the Concert of Europe, 1815-54.6 It is generally believed that the 
status of great power carries with it certain responsibilities—for managing the 
system, providing stability, ensuring international peace and security. But 
individual great powers from the time the concept was first specified (in the 
Treaty of Châtillon, 1814) have acted to undermine these responsibilities as 
much as to discharge them. Similarly, it is hard to identify a consistent pattern 
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of behaviour with regard to the balance of power. States have balanced, 
bandwagoned, and retreated to isolation with seemingly equal frequency. The 
idea of the balance of power may be a strong one in international politics, but 
there are no concomitantly strong or settled rules and norms that stem from 
it.7 
In contrast to Buzan and Holsti, Schouenborg sets out not to identify 
the primary institutions of international society as such but to provide a 
structural functional method equipped for that purpose. He accepts Buzan’s 
definition of primary institutions as ‘durable and recognised patterns of shared 
practices’ (as cited above) and proposes a number of  ‘functional categories’ 
as lenses through which these institutions (the ‘key objects’ of a properly 
sociological and scientific analysis) can be identified and differentiated. By 
‘differentiated’ he means the separation of different kinds of primary 
institutions from each other. The general idea, although Schouenborg does 
not make this explicit, is that all societies attempt in one way or another to 
perform these functions and therefore we can most effectively get at and 
understand the institutions that societies generate in relation to them 
(Schouenborg, 2001: 28-31; see also Buzan and Albert, 2010: 318). 
Schouenborg’s functional categories are derived from five proposed but not 
developed by Buzan: (i) membership; (ii) authoritative communication; (iii) 
limits to the use of force; (iv) allocation of property rights; an (v) sanctity of 
agreements; and six proposed by Donnelly (2006): (i) communicating and 
interacting; (ii) regulating the use of force; (iii) regulating ownership and 
exchange; (iv) making rules; (v) aggregating interests and power; and (vi) 
regulating conflicts. Schouenborg welcomes these categories as an important 
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step forward but finds them inadequate in several respects. In particular he 
finds them too closely tied to a modern, Westphalian conception of the 
international system and therefore unsuited to analysis of a more ambitious 
‘genuine historical-sociological’ (Schouenborg, 2011: 31) kind. Buzan’s 
categories, for example, privilege the state, and both Buzan’s and Donnelly’s 
categories put undue emphasis on another largely ‘modern’ phenomenon, the 
attempt to limit morally and legally the resort to force. Under what he calls the 
‘constitutive functional category’ of ‘legitimacy and membership’8 
Schouenborg places ‘polities’ rather than the state (the state being the 
dominant modern form of polity); and he broadens the ‘regulative functional 
category’ that relates to constraints on the use of force to ‘regulating conflicts’. 
In brief, Schouenborg’s putative transhistorical and transcultural scheme 
contains five functional categories, divided into two types of functional 
categories, constitutive and regulative, with 10 institutions listed as possible 
candidates in the former and 12 in the latter (see Tables 7 and 8). 
 
Table 7: Schouenborg’s constitutive functional category and institutions (see 
end of document) 
 
Table 8: Schouenborg’s regulative functional categories and institutions (see 
end of document) 
 
Problems with the New Institutionalism 
These three authors have made a valiant attempt to grapple with a difficult 
matter. But problems remain. While the ground on which we are to build a 
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theory of primary institutions has been usefully surveyed it remains worryingly 
unstable. On a first reading the ‘institutional density’ (Onuf, 2002: 218) that 
Buzan imputes to international society is not implausible. It incorporates a 
number of potential candidates for institutional status—notably sovereignty, 
the market, nationalism, and human rights—that Bull and others failed to 
consider. The messiness of the list conforms better to what many professional 
IR students feel about the normative and/or regulatory architecture of the 
international scene. Bull’s scheme seems just too neat.9 However, Buzan’s list 
of institutions reads like an enumeration of all the significant general 
developments, ideas, policies, principles, practices, and goals that have 
attained a degree of international permanence over the last few hundred 
years. While the definitions Buzan puts forward certainly do not bar these 
items from consideration, one wonders where to draw the line. If the market, 
for example, can be viewed as a master institution (with trade liberalization, 
financial liberalization, and hegemonic stability as their derivatives), why not 
capitalism (with free trade, capital mobility, labour mobility, privatisation, and 
currency convertibility as derivatives)? If equality of peoples can be viewed as 
a master institution (with human rights and humanitarian intervention as 
derivatives), why not peaceful settlement of disputes (with arbitration, 
mediation and adjudication as derivatives)? If non-intervention and 
international law can be considered derivative institutions of sovereignty, why 
not territoriality and boundaries, given the sovereign state is a constitutionally 
independent territorial entity?10 Could not democracy be regarded with equal 
logic as a derivative institution of equality of people vis à vis nationalism? If 
environmental stewardship can be regarded as a primary institution why not 
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protection and promotion of human rights, international peace and security, 
and sustainable development (all of them being established aspirations of the 
international community which have brought into being a complex body of 
rules, practices, and secondary institutions)? The possibilities seem almost 
endless. The problem will not, however, be solved by tighter or more complex 
definitions as all the definitions produced so far leave plenty of room for 
observer subjectivity. In other words, even if we could agree on a common 
definition of primary institutions there is no reason to believe that our 
application of it would lead to our lists and taxonomies of institutions 
significantly converging. With regard to types of primary institution, Buzan’s 
division of master/derivative is no better or no worse than Holsti’s 
foundational/procedural or, for that matter, Reus-Smit’s (1997) division 
between ‘constitutional structures’ and ‘fundamental institutions’. They are 
three among many possible ways of differentiating between types of 
institutions. They are logical on the abstract plane but empirically entirely 
ungrounded. 
 
Holsti’s analysis, as with Buzan’s, contains a number of plus points. It 
demonstrates why, for example, contrary to the claims of the ES pioneers, we 
should be sceptical about the attribution of institutional status to the balance 
of power and great power concert. Yet the subjective element in Holsti is still 
strong. With regard to foundational institutions he concedes, firstly, that 
‘sovereignty’ and ‘territoriality’ might be conceived as part of a single 
institution of sovereignty, but as they refer to ‘rather unique aspects’ he 
chooses ‘to separate them for analytical reasons’ (Holsti, 2004: 26). When it 
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comes to determining the institutions of international society, however, should 
this choice depend on analytical utility? Holsti generally writes as if his 
institutions have ontological status i.e. they exist in some sense in the real-
world regardless of the analyst’s cognition of them. How else, if they do not 
have this status, could they be deemed (as Holsti does) markers of real-world 
international change? But if such status is granted they cannot be chopped 
and changed for analytical convenience. Secondly, while the state or 
statehood meet his criteria of institutions, he dismisses them on the ground 
that they are agents whereas his other institutions ‘are not agents, but 
structures of norms, rules, and ideas that influence the behaviour of agents’ 
(Holsti, 2004: 27) In the concluding chapter, however, Holsti repeatedly refers 
to the state as one of his ‘eight institutions’ and his ‘four foundational 
institutions’ (see Table 6). This inconsistency aside, inclusion of the state 
results in the curious conceptualisation of the state, sovereignty and 
territoriality as separate institutions.11 Thirdly, Holsti concedes that his list of 
procedural institutions is not exhaustive. The market, the international 
monetary system, or foreign aid might also be thought of as institutions. If so, 
it might be added, why not the protection and promotion of human rights, 
economic development, self-determination, hegemony (see Clark, 2009, 
2011), or—a prime candidate that everyone seems to overlook—summitry?12 
Finally, he says that some institutions might be conceived as subcategories of 
broader institutions e.g. trade + international monetary regulation = the 
market. This is a suggestion akin to Buzan’s (2004: 182) notion of ‘nesting’. 
But we are furnished with no criteria to determine which ‘institutions’ should 
be nested with which.  
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After holding out the promise of a more cogent list of institutions than 
Bull’s, therefore, Holsti leaves us with a list no less subjective. Since his main 
concern is to systematically investigate change in the international system, he 
declares that it is ‘not necessary to discuss every conceivable institution’—
with the implication that a good many institutions might be conceived. Rather 
he uses the seven institutions selected as markers of change—and in the 
substantive chapters that follow he does indeed provide a an account of the 
nature and extent of change internationally over the last three centuries that 
constitutes a major contribution to the literature. But the relevant point for our 
purposes is that, appearances to the contrary, Holsti goes no further than Bull 
(and indeed Buzan) in providing a definitive, or at least methodologically well-
grounded, list of the institutions of international society. 
 
Schouenborg’s is the most explicit attempt yet to take the ES study of 
primary institutions in a structural functionalist direction. But while he makes a 
number of telling criticisms of the current ES literature (especially regarding its 
eurocentrism), he fails to make a strong case why we should go in this 
direction at all. He asserts (2011: 35) that his functional categories will enable 
us to ‘get a handle on empirical reality’. But he does not say how. He claims 
(2011: 27) that his categories ‘should be able to encompass all the institutions 
identified by English School scholars throughout history’. But why would one 
want to do this? Broadening the historical scope of the analytical scheme is in 
principle fine, but attempting to encompass all the institutions identified by the 
ES seems a misplaced ambition. It concedes too much to past ES 
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scholarship. The first thing we need to get a handle on is which of the many 
institutions posited by the ES can be empirically verified. The empirical 
question is the elephant in the room in Schouenborg’s analysis. He declares 
(2011: 28) that ‘[h]ere I will not go into the problem of how to empirically 
observe primary institutions, but merely offer some potential solutions to the 
problem of differentiating between them’. Is it possible, however, to make any 
progress in differentiating institutions without any empirical observation of 
them?  The problem of empirically observing primary institutions is exactly the 
problem that needs to be resolved if the institutional project à la ES is to get 
off the ground. What we need is data. Until we have data about what 
institutions exist internationally our speculations about them will remain just 
that, speculations; and our taxonomies and theories about them will remain 
rootless, subjective and abstract. This is clear from the list of institutions that 
Schouenberg, with all due tentativeness, suggests. He does not provide any 
guidance as to why the list of ideas, ideologies, notions and principles he puts 
in his ‘constitutive functional category’ of ‘legitimacy and membership’ (see 
Table 7) should be deemed ‘institutions’. They all pertain to which actors 
and/or states can take their rightful place as members of international society, 
but the logic of classifying them as institutions is not clear.  
 
The Diagnosis 
Why have these recent attempts to put institutions on firmer conceptual and 
methodological ground failed? Why, despite such valiant efforts, has the 
problem of varying and conflicting lists and taxonomies of primary institutions 
persisted? My diagnosis is that ES analysis has moved too far away from 
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what one of its pioneers called ‘diplomatics’ (Manning, 1962: 1-10, 56-8, 182-
4; Wilson, 2004: 759-60). Too far way, that is, from the understandings, 
assumptions, and expectations that constitute the ‘psychomilieu’ (Harold and 
Margaret Sprout, cited in Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 1981: 69-70) of those 
professionally engaged in inter-state (or more broadly inter-polity) relations. 
As Tim Dunne has argued (2005: 163), ‘it must be doubted how far an 
elaborate conceptual design favoured by Buzan can actually reveal the 
“reality” of international society’ in the absence of a strong ‘hermeneutic’ 
dimension. In my view this applies especially to the concept of institutions 
(though it is also not without significance that in this article Dunne himself in 
uses the term ‘institutions’ in a non-specified and non-hermeneutic way). 
Fashioned in the abstract, without reference to actor perceptions and 
understandings, lists of international institutions will always be in the eye of 
the beholder, and taxonomies of them similarly groundless. 
 
The Importance of Interpretation 
All three of our new institutionalists claim or assume that primary institutions 
have ontological status, i.e. they are not merely analytical tools but have real 
world existence independent of the consciousness of the observer, and that 
therefore their identification is an empirical matter (see e.g. Schouenborg, 
2011: 27-8; Buzan, 2004: 190; Holsti: 1-27) In asserting this they do not 
depart in any shape or form from the epistemology of the ES which is 
empiricist. Eschewing metaphysics, and distrustful of abstract theory (certainly 
as a starting point for analysis), members of the ES have been careful not to 
push their ideas and theories beyond what can be confirmed by observation 
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and experience (Mayall, 2009: 210).  Even their normative theories need to be 
anchored in the ‘real, lived, normative world’ of the people they are studying, 
not derived from abstract moral principles or imported from extraneous 
normative discourses (Jackson, 2009: 28-30, 34). While they are empiricists, 
however, they are not positivists. They have been sceptical about general 
causal statements about human behaviour and especially the possibility of 
arriving at universalizable laws. They pursue ‘insider’ rather than ‘outsider’ 
accounts of social reality. Their focus has been on the self-understandings, 
shared meanings, value orientations, and codes of conduct of the actors, the 
sources of which are speeches, statements, resolutions, communiques, 
declarations, press releases, memoirs and interviews (Jackson, 2009: 37; 
Navari, 2009c: 39-42). According to Navari (2009c: 47) their approach is 
‘agent centred’ and ‘practitioner orientated’. Their goal in studying 
international politics is to provide a plausible and coherent interpretation, and 
general theoretical account, of the political practitioner’s world (Jackson, 
2009: 24-26). They are not concerned with objective facts about the 
international environment so much as what the relevant actors in any given 
situation deem or assume to be the objective facts. They have tended to 
conceive the balance of power, for example, as a conscious policy rather than 
a mechanism or objective feature of international life. Unlike realists of various 
hues they have spent little time analysing the components of material power 
or its distribution since it is the perception of power that is deemed to have the 
explanatory efficacy ‘and perceptions are revealed by quizzing the actor, not 
the environment’ (Navari, 2009b: 9). 
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 The methodological approach of the ES has been characterised by 
some (e.g. Suganami, 1983: 2364-66; Dunne, 1998: 7-9; Linklater and 
Suganami, 2006: 97-108) as verstehen—the Weberian notion of 
understanding involving interpretation of the meanings that social actors 
themselves give to their actions. Allied to this the ES stresses imaginative 
identification with and reconstruction of the roles, choices, outlooks, and 
predicaments of statespersons (Keens-Soper, 1978: 25-6; Suganami, 1983: 
2364-65; Alderson and Hurrell, 2000: 25-28; Linklater and Suganami, 2006: 
109; Jackson, 2009: 29, 32; see also Butterfield, 1965: 90-96). It stresses, in 
other words, the importance of putting oneself in statespersons and other 
significant actors’ shoes and trying to see things as they see them, even 
though their outlook may be very different to that of our own.13 In sociological 
parlance the school’s methodological stance is ‘participant standpoint’. This 
involves playing ‘close attention to the language of the actors and the way 
they explain and justify their actions’ (Navari, 2009c: 42; see also Epp, 1998). 
But this does not mean that analysts must restrict themselves in their 
explanation and assessment of these actions to the language and mental 
categories of the participants/actors. Rather they use terms that would be 
recognised by the participants/actors, or would at least be comprehensible to 
them. If a more theoretical language needs to be employed, for example to 
connect with past scholarship or to facilitate academic communication, it 
should be derived from the ordinary language of the subject, losing as little as 
possible from the original meaning of that language (Jackson, 2009: 35-6). In 
this way interpretivist scholars seek to get ‘inside’ reality without surrendering 
to that reality i.e. ‘surrendering to the beliefs, values and prejudices of the 
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people under study’ (Jackson, 2000: 58; see also Dunne, 2001b: 235-7). As 
Bevir and Rhodes (2004: 130) argue ‘[i]nterpretive approaches start with the 
insight that to understand actions, practices and institutions, we need to grasp 
the relevant meanings, beliefs and preferences of the people involved’. This 
does not mean that these meanings, beliefs and preferences are holy writ and 
should be accepted uncritically (see e.g. Dowding, 2004). All data needs to be 
interpreted in light of all the relevant data that the analyst has the means, time 
and skill to gather. It does mean, however, that such interpretative data is 
essential to a rich, textured, and nuanced explanation of the studied human 
world.  
As well as employing language close to the actual language of 
international politics, the ES has traditionally employed definitions that are 
rooted in everyday discourse.  As Robert Jackson (2000: 95) argues:  
 
Our theoretical language should … avoid stipulative definitions that 
have no reference to ordinary language. A stipulated definition is one 
that is made up by the researcher. Such definitions are arbitrary from 
the point of view of their subject. They are rejections of the language of 
experience and practice. They cut us off from the people and activities 
we are trying to learn more about. They have the unfortunate effect of 
alienating the world of political science from the world of politics. 
 
James (1993b: 270) crystallises the point: ‘[c]lose regard must be paid to the 
relevant practitioner usage.’ A good example of a stipulative definition can be 
found in Keohane’s seminal article (1988: 382-6). Keohane defines institutions 
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as ‘persistent and connected sets of rules (formal or informal) that prescribe 
behavioural roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations’. They can take 
the form of relatively permanent ‘general patterns of activity’ which arise by 
and large spontaneously, or specific, human designed, arrangements 
‘identifiable in space and time’. He then declares that ‘it is difficult to work 
analytically’ with such a broad concept and offers in its place a hybrid 
understanding of institutions as ‘related complexes of rules and norms, 
identifiable in space and time’. This enables him to occlude consideration of 
‘general behavioural patterns’ and ‘general norms’ and concentrate on 
‘specific institutions’ and ‘practices’. Why the latter two should be privileged is 
not explained (nor the boundaries between ‘institutions’ and ‘practices’ 
demarcated), but the point here is that Keohane’s working definition is arrived 
at through a survey of usages of the term within mainstream IR. No 
connection is made with practitioner usage. The same applies to John 
Mearsheimer’s definition (1994/95: 8-9), which also has the hybrid quality of 
combing a general understanding (a set of prescriptive and proscriptive 
behavioural rules) with a more specific (as ‘typically formalized in international 
agreements, and … embodied in organizations’). Notwithstanding their more 
‘insider’ methodological orientation, constructivists have been just as attracted 
as neo-liberals and neo-realists to the charms of the stipulative definition. A 
recent example is the definition of practices of Adler and Pouliot (2011: 4-5):  
 
‘…socially meaningful patterns of action, which, in being performed 
more or less competently, simultaneously embody, act out, and 
possibly reify background knowledge and discourse in and on the 
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material world. [They are] … not merely descriptive ‘arrows’ that 
connect structure to agency and back, but rather the dynamic material 
and ideational processes that enable structures to be stable or to 
evolve, and agents to reproduce or transform structures’.  
 
Few practitioners would be able to comprehend a definition so abstract and 
locked in the specialist academic literature such as this. 
 
 It is in these respects that the new institutionalism marks a departure 
from the traditional approach of the ES. It is a departure not in epistemology 
but in method. While members of the ES have traditionally, if not always 
systematically or rigorously, pursued insider accounts of social reality, the 
new institutionalists pursue an outsider account.14 They have left behind the 
language of practice and the assumptions and perceptions of practitioners, 
employed stipulative definitions and, with respect to Buzan and Schouenborg 
at least, attempted to identify the primary institutions of international society 
through the application of abstract analytical categories. The result, as we 
have seen, has been a failure to make progress in arriving at a less 
speculative list of institutions around which the important job of theory-building 
can begin. There is nothing intrinsically wrong, of course, in departing 
methodologically from a traditional way of doing things. The argument I am 
making is not about methodological authenticity. Rather I am arguing that the 
new institutionalists have embarked on a course which is unlikely to lead to 
the desired destination. Rather than adopting an outsider/structuralist 
approach, the best hope of reaching this destination resides in reverting back 
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to the insider/interpretivist approach traditionally associated with the ES but, 
with the aid of Sociology, employing it much more rigorously. 
 
Grounded Theory 
The affinity between GT and the approach to IR of the ES has recently been 
noted by Navari (2009c: 42). Yet the potential for using this qualitative 
research method, first developed in Sociology, in qualitative approaches to IR 
such as the ES has gone surprisingly unexplored. GT could be applied to a 
wide variety of subject matters of central concern to the ES e.g. the role of 
international law and the place of human rights in international society.  But it 
could also be applied to the stubborn problem of the meaning and identity of 
international society’s institutions. GT has the potential to provide the missing 
hermeneutic or ‘insider’ dimension to ES thinking on international institutions.  
The ‘diplomatics’ of the international institutional landscape have been 
neglected for too long, and GT had the potential to uncover them in a 
systematic, rigorous way. Uncovering the diplomatics, however, can lead not 
only to a more empirically grounded list of international institutions but also 
more compelling explanations of the role and significance of institutions in 
international society. There are certainly problems in applying a method 
mostly used in the sociology of chronic illness, nursing, education and the 
family15 to a much more complex social environment such as the society of 
states. International society, it should be remembered, is not a real society, a 
society comprised of ‘flesh and blood’ human beings. Rather it is what 
Manning called a quasi-society (Manning, 1962: 21-22, 27-31; Wilson, 2004: 
759-60), or a second-order society ‘where the members are not individual 
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human beings but durable collectivities of humans possessed of identities and 
actor qualities that are more than the sum of their parts’ (Buzan, 2004: 24-5, 
188-90). We cannot ask the members of this society about the institutional 
complexion of their lives. The only people we can ask are the representatives 
of those members and those in prominent and influential positions in the 
activity of world politics. This means we have to adapt GT to our specific 
needs. But one of the strengths of GT is its flexibility. It consists of a 
systematic yet flexible set of procedures for theory-building. In this section I 
set out the principles of GT research16 and provide some hypothetical 
examples of what the elements in a GT research programme on the 
institutions of international society might look like. In the next section I explore 
further the complementarity of the two approaches. In the final section I spell 
out the mutual advantages of bringing together GT and the ES before 
concluding on the next step to be taken to get an ES-inspired grounded theory 
of institutions up and running. 
 
 At its origin GT was an attempt to blend the sociological methods of 
Columbia School positivism and Chicago School pragmatism. Its classic text 
is Glaser and Strauss (2008 [1967]). As with much ES theory of the time the 
starting point for GT was scepticism about the assumptions underlying 
quantitative social science such as the possibility of ‘reducing qualities of 
human experience to quantifiable variables’ (Charmaz, 1995: 29), the 
possibility of scientific objectivity, and the goals of establishing causal 
relationships and deriving universalizable propositions about social behaviour. 
From the Columbia School it took the need to be systematic in analysis, 
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explicit about research procedures, and generative of abstract theory. From 
the Chicago School, for some the senior partner (hence the tendency to 
equate GT with it in the literature) it took the emphasis on agency, the 
assumption that process was more important than structure (the latter being 
created by humans engaging in processes), the stress on subjective and 
inter-subjective understandings, and its focus on the intimate relationship 
between language, meaning and action. Essentially Glaser and Strauss 
sought to put qualitative research on a much more systematic footing, in order 
to counter claims from the quantitative researchers that such work was 
impressionistic and unscientific (see e.g. Glaser and Strauss, 2008 [1967]: 10-
18, 223, 259-62). They contended that the ‘logico-deductive’ approach, 
increasingly dominant in the social sciences, of testing hypotheses derived 
from existing theory risked ‘forcing the data’ (see e.g. Glaser and Strauss, 
2008 [1967]: 98, 142-4, 261-2). This could only be avoided by taking a more 
inductive approach in which theory emerged from the data. The strategies 
they proposed involved simultaneous data collection and analysis, deriving 
‘codes’ (essentially analytical categories) from data rather than from extant 
theory, and developing theory at each stage of the data collection and 
analysis. Through inter alia interviews and participant observation researchers 
immerse themselves in the lived lives of their subjects, but with the object of 
going beyond the description of classic ethnography and generating an 
abstract, conceptual understanding of the studied phenomenon. While GT 
might be considered a form of ethnography in its desire to obtain a non-
judgmental, dense, textured, ‘insider’ understanding of the life or a particular 
group, unlike classic ethnography it is not concerned to record every 
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dimension of that life, only those dimensions which have pertinence to the 
emerging theory. While classic ethnography and GT both amass data, the 
latter is more focussed and selective and avoids the accumulation of 
‘mountains of unconnected data’ (Charmaz, 2006: 23). In sum, while the 
approach of GT is empirical and non-positivist, its object is eminently 
theoretical. Glaser and Strauss (2008 [1967]: 2) define it as ‘the discovery of 
theory from data systematically obtained from social research’. 
 
 A typical GT is constructed in five stages: data gathering; coding; 
memo-writing; theoretical sampling; and theory drafting. These stages, in 
practice, are rarely discrete. Questions arising in one stage frequently require 
returning to an earlier stage of the process. The first stage involves the 
gathering of ‘rich data’. This is the data that enables the researcher to see the 
world from the research participants’ point of view. The grounded researcher 
employs a variety of data collection methods including participant observation, 
interviews, questionnaires, and textual analysis of records and reports. The 
object of the exercise is to reveal the participants’ views, feelings, 
experiences, intentions, actions, as well the contexts and structure of the 
aspect of their lives under scrutiny. From this first stage GT pursues a flexible 
approach. Methods of collection employed vary according to the research 
problem. Sometimes issues arising from the very process of data gathering 
require them to be modified.  The initial course of study will be shaped by 
certain background assumptions and perspectives, including disciplinary 
perspectives. Indeed it is neither possible nor desirable for the researcher, no 
matter how skilled, to come to the data cold. The researcher needs certain 
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‘background interests’ or ‘sensitizing concepts’ in order to begin the process 
of thinking analytically about the data (Charmaz, 1995: 32, 49; Glaser and 
Strauss, 2008 [1967]: 3, 46). For the ES the relationship between ‘principles’, 
‘practices’, ‘institutions’ and international behaviour could constitute such 
interests and concepts. But the skilled and/or experienced grounded 
researcher would recognise these as valuable but not limiting points of 
departure. He or she strives to be as open as possible to changes in direction, 
and guard against locking the process into original conceptual frameworks, 
and forcing preconceived ideas and theories onto the data. One sense in 
which the stages of research should not be regarded as discrete is that in GT 
research data and concepts exist in constant tension and mutual relation. 
Unlike classic ethnography there is no separation between data collection and 
analysis. The two occur simultaneously. The object is not description but 
theoretical interpretation. The grounded researcher moves backwards and 
forwards from theory to data. In this way the theoretical framework becomes 
progressively refined. With regard to participant interviews, for example, the 
grounded researcher prefers a semi-structured or an unstructured approach. 
This enables interesting ideas and issues to be explored as soon as they 
arise. These ideas and issues, in turn, may influence the shape and content of 
subsequent interviews. In this way the data collection not only becomes more 
focussed but intimately connected with the emerging theory. 
 
 The next step in GT is known as ‘coding’. It involves giving segments of 
data a label that categorises and summarises that data. This is the first formal 
step in providing a conceptual understanding of the data. In the words of one 
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leading proponent, ‘[c]oding is the pivotal link between collecting data and 
developing an emergent theory to explain these data’ (Charmaz, 2006: 46). 
Codes ‘are elements of a nascent theory that explains the data and informs 
further data gathering’ (Charmaz, 2006: 46). They capture and condense 
often complex meanings and actions. The researcher constantly revises and 
refines his/her codes in the light of new data. ‘Initial’ codes, highly specific and 
detailed, give way to ‘focussed’ codes, more conceptual and synthetic, as the 
theoretical direction of the study takes shape. Some grounded researchers 
utilise in vivo codes. This is the use of ‘telling phrases’, ‘activity specific 
terminology’, or ‘insider shorthand’ as a code. Such language is characteristic 
of many social activities (‘going native’, being ‘on/off message’, ‘speaking truth 
to power’, and ‘frank exchange of views’ being examples from politics and 
diplomacy). The advantage of such codes is that they anchor the analysis in 
participants’ worlds and provide texture that ex vivo codes no matter how 
accurate a representation of the data are unable to do. 
 
 Coding enables a leap to be taken, but not in any predetermined way, 
from the specific and concrete to the general and abstract. The process is 
taken further with memo-writing. Memos are informal and provisional analytic 
notes written whenever codes prompt broader ideas. These ideas may relate, 
for example, to commonalities in the data where participants relate common 
views and experiences. Memos expedite the identification of themes and 
patterns, and help to direct and fine-tune future data-gathering and coding. 
They identify ways in which codes can be ‘clustered’ and subsequently 
framed as analytical ‘categories’, which are construed as the principal 
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conceptual elements in the emerging theory. One could envisage, for 
example, different understandings of ‘institutions’ among diplomats as such 
categories in an emergent theory of the institutional structure of international 
society (e.g. ‘institution as organization’, ‘institution as regime’, ‘institution as 
practice’). Categories might consist of in vivo codes taken directly from the 
discourse of participants or the researcher’s own comprehension and 
summation of what is happening in the data. 
 
 The purpose of theoretical sampling, the fourth ‘stage’ in GT research, 
is to refine and strengthen analytical categories. This is achieved by returning 
to the data to gauge the extent to which conjectures or hypotheses contained 
within any given category (e.g. ‘the balance of power understood as a set of 
assumptions and expectations is a major factor in the determination of state 
behaviour’) stand up. If they are found to insufficiently capture participants’ 
views and experiences they will need to be elaborated or refined (e.g. ‘the 
balance of power understood as a set of assumptions and expectations is an 
ever-present background factor in the determination of state behaviour but 
becomes a foreground factor at times of instability and tension’). At this point 
additional data may be required to test the new category. But it is important to 
note that the burden of this task is now lighter due to the sharper focus of the 
study. In addition, unlike positivist and deductive research programmes, all 
the hypotheses and conjectures tested emerge from the data. The researcher 
avoids as much as possible the insertion of extant theory. The intimate 
connection between data and emergent theory is maintained at every stage of 
the process. As well as refining and strengthening categories, sampling helps 
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the researcher to identify gaps, where the categories do not accommodate the 
full range of relevant participant experiences. It also helps the researcher to 
know when to stop data gathering. This happens when the categories are 
‘saturated’ i.e. when fresh data-gathering no longer generates new theoretical 
insights.  
 
 The flexibility of GT is maintained in the final, drafting, stage. Grounded 
theorists take a critical stance towards conventional formats for the 
presentation of academic research. They tend to conduct a literature review, 
for example, towards the end of the drafting process, not the beginning, so as 
not to be unduly influenced by received theory. They sometimes include more 
raw data in their texts, e.g. excerpts from interviews, than is usual in order ‘to 
keep the human story in the forefront of the reader’s mind and to make the 
conceptual analysis more accessible to a wider audience’ (Charmaz, 1995: 
47; Glaser and Strauss, 2008 [1967]: 228-9).  The accessibility issue is 
important to grounded theorists. They contend that good theory as well as 
being empirically robust, accurate, logical, parsimonious, should be useful i.e. 
helpful not only for other social scientists but students and practitioners. It is 
vital therefore that it is understandable to these audiences, and free of 
unnecessary jargon (see e.g. Glaser and Strauss, 2008 [1967]: 1, 3, 76, 98, 
237). In the spirit of science they also argue that it should be free of 
sentimentality. But while advocating the adoption of a neutral tone they 
nonetheless acknowledge they are engaged in an act of persuasion, that 
theorising is an argumentative practice, that while their theory may be richly 
informed by the data no research process is perfect, and that their search for 
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accuracy and objectivity will always be to some extent deficient. It is at the 
drafting stage that the individual skill of the researcher is most in evidence. 
But the skill and judgment of the researcher is a major factor in all stages of 
the process, GT being a set of flexible research procedures and a craft rather 
than a set of rigid prescriptions. 
 
Common Ground 
It might be said that GT and the ES share the same general starting point and 
goal but GT has made much greater progress in identifying a rigorous method 
for getting from one to the other. The goal is straightforward: a general, 
conceptual understanding of the studied phenomena. This is what the ES 
hopes to achieve through its concepts inter alia of international society and 
primary institutions. The starting point is a shared epistemology in empiricism. 
But it would be wrong to think proponents of GT and the ES are naïve 
empiricists. While they maintain that knowledge claims must not extend 
beyond what can be observed or experienced they accept that observation 
and experience are far from unproblematic. At the outset of his classic study 
of world order, for example, Bull (1977: xv) declared that no investigation of 
the social and political world can be value-free. Social and political analysis is 
always derived from certain premises. All the analyst can do is subject these 
premises to investigation and criticism, and resist the temptation (strong in a 
politically highly-charged subject such as IR) of partisanship (Jackson, 2009: 
24-6). In this way it is possible to achieve a higher degree of scholarly 
detachment than would otherwise be the case. GT occupies exactly this 
ground. While it places great stress on the role of data, it does not view data 
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as lying idly on the wayside waiting to be discovered. Data does not 
objectively exist but is constructed through the interaction of observer and 
observed. The premises and preconceptions of the observer are an 
eradicable part of the equation. All the researcher can hope to do is reduce 
this element through self-reflexivity, i.e. by consistently reflecting on his or her 
premises and preconceptions and how they might affect their collection and 
interpretation of the data. In sum, both the ES and GT reject scientific 
neutrality but they aspire through what might be termed self-reflexive 
empiricism to relatively objective knowledge. 
 
There are two other important areas of common ground between GT 
and the ES that need to be highlighted. First, both schools pay close attention 
to language. As we have seen the ES, if not the new institutionalism, has 
been concerned to keep the language of theory and practice close together. 
The way practitioners speak has been seen as a vital window into the way 
they think, and the way they think an indispensable guide for making sense of 
the actions and activities of the collective bodies they represent.17 Similarly, 
grounded theorists stress the importance of recording the views and 
experiences of research participants in their own terms, paying close attention 
to words and phrases that may carry special meaning. In doing so 
researchers may be able to enter implicit worlds of meaning otherwise closed 
to them. This does not mean they are barred, once the data has been 
collected, coded, and categorised, from using the language of their disciplines 
or wider ‘external’ discourses to relate the bigger story. But they are alert to 
the danger of casting this story in ‘a lifeless language that better fits our 
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academic and bureaucratic worlds than those of our participants’ (Charmaz, 
2006: 69). Paying close attention to participants’ language helps the 
researcher bridge the gap between the lived experience of the former and the 
sometimes blinkered disciplinarity of the latter. It also helps them to enter the 
normative worlds of their participants and discern the standards of value that 
guide their conduct. Having an insight into such standards is an essential 
ingredient of any humanistic as opposed to purely physical or mechanical 
study (Jackson, 2009: 21-32). 
 
 Secondly, both schools are united in their conviction that methods 
alone do not guarantee good research. According to Jackson (2009: 33) the 
attainment of a high level of academic knowledge ‘is not merely a question of 
good methodology. It is far more a question of academic virtue’. The 
academic virtues involved in the study of human affairs include intellectual 
honesty, impartiality, imagination, and love of learning. According to Charmaz 
(2006: 15) ‘[a] method provides a tool to enhance seeing but does not provide 
automatic insight’. There are no foolproof methods. The skill of the researcher 
is always an essential ingredient.  Researchers continuously exercise 
judgments, and the quality of these judgments will always be a function of 
their individual capabilities and experience. This is the ‘craft’ element that 
proponents of both GT and ES are keen to emphasise (Charmaz, 2006: 10-
12; Jackson, 2000: 91-6; Jackson, 2009). While GT has developed a widely 
accepted and practiced set of research procedures there is no litany to be 
faithfully reproduced regardless of circumstance. As in the ES tradition, a 
large degree of latitude is given to the judgment and imagination of 
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researchers to frame their study as they see fit given their purposes and the 
resources available to them. What is sacrosanct is that the theory should 
emerge from the data, not forced upon it, and that researchers should be 
prepared to reframe their study if the accumulating data calls into question the 
original design. 
 
Towards a Grounded Theory 
The common ground between the ES and GT is too fertile not to be exploited. 
The ES provides GT with a new area—international society—in which to 
extend and test its research strategy. In the view of Charmaz (1995: 28-9) GT 
methods are appropriate for studying ‘individual processes, interpersonal 
relations and the reciprocal effects between individuals and larger social 
processes’. The extent to which they can usefully be applied to inter-
communal relations, where individuals are primarily agents of large and 
complex social groups, is the test. It is certainly a demanding test given the 
second-order and anarchical nature of international society, its cultural 
diversity, its multiplicity of languages, and its vast array of national traditions. 
These basic features engender an environment in which there is there is often 
a big gap between appearance and reality, between what people say and 
what they do, between what they say and what they think, and between what 
they say to one audience and what they say to another. While ‘doublespeak’ 
(Orwell, 1981 [1949]), ‘two level games’ (Putmann, 1988), and ‘strategic 
cover-ups’ (Mearsheimer, 2011), to cite some of the terms invented to capture 
this reality, are far from unknown in domestic settings, in the international 
setting they are normal. Accurate interpretation of the multiple layers of 
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meaning in international society is certainly a challenge. But the recent 
application of interpretative techniques to areas such as diplomacy 
(Neumann, 2011) suggests that this is a challenge we should not be too 
daunted to meet.18 Nor is it one entirely without precedent in ES thinking.19  
The ES also provides GT with a point of departure in the international realm 
with ‘background interests’ such as the search for the bases of international 
order (see e.g. James, 1973; Vincent, 1974; Bull, 1977; Hurrell 2007) and the 
relationship between order and justice (see e.g. Bull, 1977: 77-98; Harris, 
1993; Wheeler, 2000; Williams, 2005), and ‘sensitizing concepts’ such as 
primary institutions, secondary institutions, and international society. 
 
 GT provides the ES with a set of techniques to enable the systematic 
gathering of data on practitioner understandings of the institutional structure of 
international society. Depending on the size and geographical scope of the 
study the patterns we discern may be complex, but for the first time we will 
have detailed evidence of how practitioners conceive that structure and its 
component parts. For the first time our understanding of the nature and 
identity of the international institutions would be empirically grounded. It may 
turn out that the putative central idea/concept/insight of the ES, primary 
institutions, is not corroborated. It may turn out that secondary institutions 
loom far larger in the psychomilieu of practitioners. This should be grist to the 
ES mill. The point about an ES-inspired GT of international institutions is it 
provides a starting place and initial sense of direction for systematic research 
but should in no way predetermine its course and destination.  
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In the process important light could be thrown on another stubborn 
problem in IR theory: the relationship between institutions and practices. More 
than 30 years ago Keens-Soper (178: 43-4) bemoaned the lack of unified 
usage of these terms and the conditions that, in particular, qualified a 
‘practice’ to be named an ‘institution’. A few years later Suganami (1983: 
2365) conceived practices as one element of institutions along with social 
rules, conventions and usages. As we have seen above, Holsti’s 
understanding of institutions makes strong reference to ‘patterned practices’, 
as does Buzan’s to ‘durable shared practices’ or ‘enduring fundamental 
practices’ (see also Hurrell, 2007: 59; Reus-Smit, 2002: 503).  According to 
Navari (2011: 618-21) the ES’s understanding of institutions is identical to 
understandings of practice prevailing in social practice theory (in particular 
those of Stephen Turner and Ted Schatzki). However, Duffield (2007: 11) 
contends that the identification of institutions with practices ‘has found little 
favor’ within IR and he excludes the latter from his unified definition of the 
former. Here he sides with rationalist and constructivist analysts (against 
those taking a more sociological approach) who contend that associating 
institutions closely with practices and/or patterned behaviour limits its 
explanatory value because it is precisely the impact of institutions on practice 
that they wish to explain. The explanans needs to be kept separate from the 
explanandum. In line with this, constructivists Adler and Pouliot (2011) draw a 
sharp distinction between practices and institutions. However, they provide as 
examples of the practices a series of things (e.g. diplomacy, the balance of 
power, international law, human rights) that the ES would regard as 
institutions. We have therefore a confused picture in IR of the meaning of and 
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relationship between institutions and practices. With practices, as with 
institutions, the source of this confusion is reliance on stipulative definitions 
and the failure to ground interpretations in practitioner understandings and 
experience.  Until definitions become more firmly grounded in the social reality 
of practitioner understandings and experience there is every likelihood that 
conceptualisations and disagreements will continue to proliferate and 
conceptual anarchy reign. 
 
But a grounded theory of international institutions would go beyond 
definition and seek a general conceptual understanding of the role and 
relative importance of institutions, and an evaluation of how they might be 
made more effective or otherwise improved. It would be a general 
understanding, however, that emerged from the data, an ‘insider’ 
understanding of what those professionally or otherwise intimately involved in 
international relations conceive to be the role, relative importance, value, and 
potential for progressive change of institutions. Such an approach will not, of 
course, provide all the answers. But it holds out the prospect of grounding our 
understanding and evaluation of institutions in empirical reality, something 
which prevailing ‘outsider’ accounts, despite the importance they attach to 
empirical validation, have so far failed to do. 
 
The Next Step 
A grounded theory of international institutions along these lines, however, 
cannot be built overnight. The resource implications are considerable. To get 
such a project properly off the ground will require substantial institutional 
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funding. But this does not mean that the ‘lone scholar’, the main modality of 
research within the ES, cannot make progress on small projects, focussing on 
particular foreign service departments, particular groups of international civil 
servants, or particular gatherings of specific international fora. With regard to 
perceptions of the international institutional environment one can envisage 
interviews of experienced practitioners, supplemented by questionnaires, 
being a rich source of data. But it is only once the data is collected that the 
process of mapping, for the first time confidently, the institutional contours of 
international society can begin; and it is only once we have begun to put 
together a reliable map that we will be in a position to begin the job of 
exploring the terrain more theoretically. 
 
 One of the limitations of the approach is that it cannot be applied to 
historical international societies, or rather it can only be applied in the form of 
analysis of extant texts—historical documents, memoirs, personal papers and 
the like. But one of the advantages is that there is considerable scope for 
conducting GT research collectively, utilising a division of labour, and 
involving doctoral students, early-career researchers, as well as more 
seasoned scholars. In this sense the notion of an ES research ‘project’ (e.g. 
Clark, 2011: 49; Schouenborg, 2011: 28) can be made real and the problem 
of lack of cumulation which has dogged studies in the ES tradition for the first 
time significantly addressed. While it would be foolish to ignore the difficulties 
in producing a fully-fledged grounded theory the potential long-term gains are 
considerable. In the process the analytical promise of the ES, long 
recognised, could be substantially delivered. 
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1
 Earlier versions of this paper were presented to the annual convention of the British 
International Studies Association, Cambridge, 2007, research workshops at the LSE in 2010 
and 2011, and to the Institute for Policy Research, John Hopkins University SAIS Bologna 
Center, 2012. I am grateful for the many helpful comments received, in particular from Mats 
Berdal, Barry Buzan, Richard Campanaro, Marco Cesa, Jens Meierhenrich, and three 
anonymous referees of this journal. 
2
 Note, however, that for James diplomacy is a prerequisite of both an international society 
and an international system. It is hard to conceive of relations of any scale or significance 
occurring, according to James (1993a; 1993b), without the system of communication called 
diplomacy. 
3
 Some of the likely construction difficulties are pointed out in Evans and Wilson (1992: 340-
41) and Dunne (1995: 140-43). A more positive assessment is provided in Buzan’s (1993) 
classic article. 
4
 This is Buzan’s list of contemporary (cf. historical) institutions. Changes in and of primary 
institutions occur over time. 
5
 Common ground between Holsti and the ES is substantial e.g. regarding: membership of the 
‘club of states’ (pp. 117, 121); the relationship between sovereignty, law, and international 
order (pp.118, 142); the importance of normative rules (pp.174, 304); and on the ethical 
merits of international society (p.323). Note also his recent inclusion (and largely positive 
assessment of Bull) in Navari’s explicitly ES 2009 volume. 
6
 Something, incidentally, that Bull mentioned in one of his early essays (1966: 48) but did not 
develop. 
7
 Note, however, that Holsti comes very close to conceiving the balance of power as an 
institution (according to his own definition) in a paragraph on the strong anti-hegemonial 
tendencies of international society (Holsti, 2004: 306-7; see also 313). 
8
 Schouenborg (2011: 32-3) arrives at this formulation following engagement with Ian Clark’s 
argument that legitimacy is a ‘more fundamental’ property of international society than an 
institution. But Buzan’s ‘membership’ functional category accommodates the notion of rightful 
membership. Therefore to add ‘legitimacy’ to ‘membership’ seems on the face of it 
superfluous.  
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9
 A few years earlier Nicholas Onuf (2002: 223) spotted a possible paradox: ‘Short lists of 
international institutions belie claims of historical grounding, and they betray a narrow set of 
assumptions about what rules do and what institutions count. Long, open-ended lists would 
honour the historical record, but they would also make any general pattern or developmental 
tendency impossible to discern’. 
10
 A lot, of course, depends on what one means by ‘sovereignty’. Conceptualizations abound 
(see e.g. James, 1986, 1999; Jackson, 2007). Note that according to Schouenborg (2011: 36-
7) international law should not be considered an institution at all since ‘explicit rule-making’ is 
a property of all institutions. 
11
 It should also be noted that his use of the term institutions is not entirely consistent. He 
sometimes uses it to signify (in Buzan’s scheme) secondary as well as primary institutions 
(see e.g. pp. 4, 19, 20, 28, 305). 
12
 It might be contended that summitry is an aspect of the larger institution of diplomacy. In 
response it could be said: (a) summitry performs a variety of functions not of all of them 
diplomatic e.g. enhancing the domestic political prestige of the participants, raising the 
international profile of the host venue, putting the host venue of the economic/tourist map; 
and (b) if territoriality, statehood and sovereignty can be conceived as separate institutions, 
why not summitry and diplomacy? See Dunn (1996). 
13
 Which Butterfield (1965: 9) contended must be possible otherwise people would be ‘for 
ever locked away from one another’ and all generations (and by extension all classes, 
nations, cultures, professions, etc.) ‘must be regarded as a world and a law unto themselves’.  
14
 Note in this regard Dunne’s (2001b: 230) observation that Buzan and Little (2000) pursue ‘a 
quasi-positivist approach to history that is at odds with the hermeneutic approach of earlier 
English School research’. 
15
 Seminal works include Glaser and Strauss (1968), Hood (1983), Biernacki (1986), Chenitz 
and Swanson (1986), Charmaz (1991). 
16
 Drawing primarily on Glaser and Strauss (2008 [1967]), Charmaz (1995) and Charmaz 
(2006). 
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17
 Navari (2009b; 2011) emphasises the importance of intentionality in ES thinking and its 
concern with conduct—self-conscious acts informed to a greater or lesser extent by normative 
rules—rather than ‘raw’ behaviour. 
18
 Neumann (2011: 1) describes his work as a ‘historically informed ethnography of 
diplomacy’. It contains many valuable observations and provides a texture to our 
understanding of diplomacy missing in many general accounts. However I must confess that I 
find Neumann’s approach insufficiently systematic to produce the ‘relatively objective’ 
knowledge called for in this article. He feeds his data through extant and favoured analytical 
constructs (principally Foucault on discourse, power, and knowledge production; Taylor on 
the ‘heroic’ and ‘bureaucratic’ stories of the ‘Western self’) too early in the research process. 
While in the spirit of Anthropology he acknowledges the importance of non-judgmental and 
data-led theory (see e.g. p. 187), in terms of GT he forces the data. 
19
 Intriguingly, not long before he died Hedley Bull submitted a proposal to the Ford 
Foundation to conduct an ethnographic study of diplomacy (Der Derian, 1996: 85, 97). 
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Table 1: Institutions of International Society: Wight 
Wight 1 
Diplomacy 
Alliances 
Guarantees  
War  
Neutrality 
Wight 2  
Messengers 
Conferences & 
International institutions 
 
Diplomatic language 
Trade 
Wight 3 
Diplomacy 
Alliances 
Balance of Power 
Guarantees 
Arbitration 
War 
 
Table 2: Institutions of International Society: Wight according to Bull 
Wight according to Bull 1 
Alliances 
Diplomacy 
War 
Wight according to Bull 2 
International law 
Resident embassies 
Great powers 
Balance of power 
 
Table 3: Institutions of International Society: Bull 
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Bull 1: P5 
Balance of power 
International law 
Diplomacy 
War 
Great power concert 
Bull 2 
States 
Balance of power 
International law 
Diplomacy 
War 
Great power concert 
Bull 3 
Balance of power 
International law 
Diplomacy 
International organizations 
Great power concert  
 
Table 4: Institutions and Principles of International Society: Mayall 
Institutions Principles 
Diplomacy 
International law 
Great power concert 
Balance of power (?) 
Sovereignty (?) 
War (?) 
Sovereignty 
Territorial integrity 
Non-intervention 
Self-determination 
Non-discrimination 
Human rights 
Balance of power 
 
Table 5: Primary Institutions of International Society: Buzan  
Master Institutions Derivative Institutions 
Sovereignty Non-Intervention 
Law 
Territoriality Boundaries 
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Diplomacy Bilateralism 
Multilateralism 
Great power management Alliances 
War 
Balance of power 
Equality of people Human rights 
Humanitarian intervention 
Market Trade liberalization 
Financial liberalization 
Hegemonic stability 
Nationalism Self-determination 
Popular sovereignty 
Democracy 
Environmental stewardship Species survival 
Climatic stability 
 
 
Table 6: Institutions of International Society: Holsti 
Foundational Institutions Procedural Institutions 
Sovereignty 
Territoriality 
Law 
State? 
Diplomacy 
Trade 
Colonialism 
War 
Market? 
International monetary system? 
Aid? 
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Table 7: Schouenborg’s constitutive functional category and institutions 
Legitimacy and membership Sovereignty 
Dynasticism 
Popular will 
Nationalism 
Communism 
Liberal democracy 
Standard of civilization 
Capacity to govern 
Peace-loving nation 
Human rights 
 
Table 8: Schouenborg’s regulative functional categories and institutions 
Regulating conflicts War 
Great power management 
Alliances 
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Trade Relay trade 
Tribute systems 
Free trade 
Authoritative communication Messengers 
Diplomats 
Embassies 
International organization Religious sites and festivals 
Conferences and congresses 
Multilateralism 
 
